::R@keta >> Generation Web Vol.2>>
Ekonomický kolaps, ekonomická krize a další děsivé prognózy
Lord_Palda »
Ja porad rikam, že doatavet Temelin je nutnost. A nakoupit zasoby uranu na dlouhou dobu.
helvete »
Related predpoved:
The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century, George Friedman, 2009
As we've seen, the changes that lead to the next era are always shockingly unexpected, and the first twenty years of this new century will be no exception. The U.S.–Islamist war is already ending and the next conflict is in sight. Russia is re-creating its old sphere of influence, and that sphere of influence will inevitably challenge the United States. The Russians will be moving westward on the great northern European plain. As Russia reconstructs its power, it will encounter the U.S.-dominated NATO in the three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—as well as in Poland. There will be other points of friction in the early twenty-first century, but this new cold war will supply the flash points after the U.S.–Islamist war dies down.
The Russians can't avoid trying to reassert power, and the United States can't avoid trying to resist. But in the end Russia can't win. Its deep internal problems, massively declining population, and poor infrastructure ultimately make Russia's long-term survival prospects bleak. And the second cold war, less frightening and much less global than the first, will end as the first did, with the collapse of Russia.
...
Then there is Turkey, currently the seventeenth-largest economy in the world. Historically, when a major Islamic empire has emerged, it has been dominated by the Turks. The Ottomans collapsed at the end of World War I, leaving modern Turkey in its wake. But Turkey is a stable platform in the midst of chaos. The Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Arab world to the south are all unstable. As Turkey's power grows—and its economy and military are already the most powerful in the region—so will Turkish influence.
Finally there is Poland. Poland hasn't been a great power since the sixteenth century. But it once was—and, I think, will be again. Two factors make this possible. First will be the decline of Germany. Its economy is large and still growing, but it has lost the dynamism it has had for two centuries. In addition, its population is going to fall dramatically in the next fifty years, further undermining its economic power. Second, as the Russians press on the Poles from the east, the Germans won't have an appetite for a third war with Russia. The United States, however, will back Poland, providing it with massive economic and technical support. Wars—when your country isn't destroyed—stimulate economic growth, and Poland will become the leading power in a coalition of states facing the Russians.
The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century, George Friedman, 2009
As we've seen, the changes that lead to the next era are always shockingly unexpected, and the first twenty years of this new century will be no exception. The U.S.–Islamist war is already ending and the next conflict is in sight. Russia is re-creating its old sphere of influence, and that sphere of influence will inevitably challenge the United States. The Russians will be moving westward on the great northern European plain. As Russia reconstructs its power, it will encounter the U.S.-dominated NATO in the three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—as well as in Poland. There will be other points of friction in the early twenty-first century, but this new cold war will supply the flash points after the U.S.–Islamist war dies down.
The Russians can't avoid trying to reassert power, and the United States can't avoid trying to resist. But in the end Russia can't win. Its deep internal problems, massively declining population, and poor infrastructure ultimately make Russia's long-term survival prospects bleak. And the second cold war, less frightening and much less global than the first, will end as the first did, with the collapse of Russia.
...
Then there is Turkey, currently the seventeenth-largest economy in the world. Historically, when a major Islamic empire has emerged, it has been dominated by the Turks. The Ottomans collapsed at the end of World War I, leaving modern Turkey in its wake. But Turkey is a stable platform in the midst of chaos. The Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Arab world to the south are all unstable. As Turkey's power grows—and its economy and military are already the most powerful in the region—so will Turkish influence.
Finally there is Poland. Poland hasn't been a great power since the sixteenth century. But it once was—and, I think, will be again. Two factors make this possible. First will be the decline of Germany. Its economy is large and still growing, but it has lost the dynamism it has had for two centuries. In addition, its population is going to fall dramatically in the next fifty years, further undermining its economic power. Second, as the Russians press on the Poles from the east, the Germans won't have an appetite for a third war with Russia. The United States, however, will back Poland, providing it with massive economic and technical support. Wars—when your country isn't destroyed—stimulate economic growth, and Poland will become the leading power in a coalition of states facing the Russians.
Z8TH »
helvete (13:58:14): to beru, přesto jaká jsou ta konkrétní čísla, přestat spolu obchodovat ani jedna strana nechce a myslím, že právě od toho se budou odvíjet veškerá diplomatická jednání
helvete »
Z8TH (13:50:34): Bacha, export z EU do Ruska tvori kolem 5% EU exportu, zatimco RU -> EU tvori 45% ruskeho exportu, takze v tomhle ma EU znacne navrch. Ze jsou v tom strategicke suroviny jako ropa a plyn, to je trosku slozitejsi, ale stejne...
Z8TH »
Pralinka2 (11:49:00): peníze především, to radši řeknou Ukrajinci, máte smůlu, když my si to s Ruskem nemůžeme tak rozházet, prodáváme tam svůj export, v takových případech jdou práva stranou, živí nás ekonomika nikoliv spravedlnost
mimochodem včera večer na čt mluvil nějaký politický geograf a krom toho, že řekl, že výsledky referenda jsou až nápadné a to jak volební účastí, tak výsledkem, tak řekl velmi zajímavou věc, mnozí už slaví připojení Krymu k Rusku, ale Putin se už týden nevyjádřil, a odhadoval, že Putin teď má krušné chvilky kdy přemýšlí, jak z toho elegantně vybruslit,
mimochodem včera večer na čt mluvil nějaký politický geograf a krom toho, že řekl, že výsledky referenda jsou až nápadné a to jak volební účastí, tak výsledkem, tak řekl velmi zajímavou věc, mnozí už slaví připojení Krymu k Rusku, ale Putin se už týden nevyjádřil, a odhadoval, že Putin teď má krušné chvilky kdy přemýšlí, jak z toho elegantně vybruslit,
Hitoshi »
mě se cela ta afera kolem krymu zda hysterická, nebojim se ničeho dokud mi nezačnou na hlavu padat rakety